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Why is it that many democracies have adopted progressive income taxes
(Snyder and Kramer(1988), Cukierman and Meltzer(1991))? It is diﬃcult
to provide a normative justiﬁcation to such a feature, since the optimal
taxation literature has proved inconclusive on the shape of the tax function
(see Myles(2000) for a recent account)1. Moreover, a positive explanation
based on the self-interest of citizens/voters seems more in line with the
reality of the choice of tax schemes.
Unfortunately, the political economy approach suﬀe r sf r o map r o b l e mo f
equilibrium existence due to the multidimensionality of the voting problem.
To allow voters (or their representatives) to choose between both progressive
and regressive tax schemes, the set of feasible tax schedules must be at least
bidimensional. But we know since Plott(1967) that it is highly unlikely to
ﬁnd a Condorcet winner (an option preferred by a majority to any other
feasible option) in multidimensional settings.
The reason for the inexistence of a Condorcet winner can be explained
directly in the context of the vote over multidimensional taxes with ﬁxed in-
come (i.e. non distortionary taxation). Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin(1995)
have shown that for income distributions where median income is below
mean income, any concave tax scheme receives less popular support than
any convex tax scheme provided that the latter treats the poorest agent no
worse than the former. The majority in favor of progressivity (i.e. con-
vex tax function) is composed of low income individuals who thereby shift
the burden of taxation towards high incomes. On the other hand, Hin-
driks(2001) has shown in the context of quadratic tax functions that for any
convex tax function there is a concave one that is supported by a majority
of voters. This majority is composed of both low and high income people
who favor the regressivity because it shifts the burden of tax towards middle
1On the other hand, Young (1990) has shown that when the planner’s objective is to
choose a “fair” tax schedule, the equal sacriﬁce requirement implies progressive taxation.
1income voters. Putting together Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin(1995) and
Hindriks(2001) results in the cyclicity of the majority voting rule, resulting
in the absence of a Condorcet winner.
Political economy papers studying taxation adopt various strategies to
face this inexistence problem. Early papers (Romer (1975), Roberts (1977))
reduce the policy space to linear tax schedules and obtain a Condorcet win-
ner involving average progressivity. Berliant and Gouveia (1994) introduce
uncertainty over the income distribution and then use the ex-ante budget
balance requirement to reduce the policy space so that a Condorcet winner
exists. Snyder and Kramer(1988) assume that candidates cannot credibly
commit to implement something diﬀerent from their most-preferred policy
and thus restrict the policy space to the policies that are ideal for some
voter. Roemer (1999) is not interested in Condorcet winners but uses a
diﬀerent solution concept (called the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium)
b a s e do nt h en e e dt or e a c ha ni n t r a - p a r ty consensus among ’opportunists’
whose only objective is to win the elections, and ’militants’ who care only
about the policy chosen by their party.
This paper wishes to stress that the usual proofs of the inexistence of a
Condorcet winner (such as in Plott(1967)) crucially depend on the candidate
policy to be in the interior of the policy set. If this set is closed, and if voters
have corner preferences, it is much easier to obtain a Condorcet winner on
the boundary of the feasible set, since directions favored by a majority of
voters may be infeasible2.
The rest of the paper applies this idea to the political choice of taxation.
More precisely, we present in Section 2 the model studied by Roemer(1999)
w h e r ei n c o m ei sﬁxed and taxation quadratic. We show in Section 3 that in-
centive constraints result in the policy set to be closed, and that individuals
2Both Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin(1995) and Hindriks(2001) assume that it is pos-
sible to construct a (respectively) more and less progressive tax schedule, i.e. they also
assume that the tax schedule under consideration belongs to the interior of the feasible
set.
2all have corner solutions over this set. We show that, if a Condorcet win-
ner exists, it involves maximum progressivity (Proposition 2) and we give
necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the income distribution for a Con-
dorcet winner to exist (Proposition 3). We then use numerical illustrations
to show the plausibility of these conditions, and ﬁnd that they are satisﬁed
for a large class of income distributions. Section 4 concludes by stressing
the generality, but also the weaknesses, of our approach.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals who
diﬀer only in their (ﬁxed) income level. Each individual is characterized
by her income, y ∈ [0,1]. The distribution of income in the population
is described by a strictly increasing cumulative distribution function F on
[0,1],s ot h a tF(y) is the fraction of the population with pre-tax income less










We assume throughout that ym ≤ y , i.e. we restrict ourselves to posi-
tively skewed income distributions as typically observed in real world. For
every individual with pre-tax income y, the after-tax income is
x(y,t)=y − t(y) (3)
where t(y) is a continuous tax function t : R+ → R.N o t et h a tw ea l l o wf o r
negative taxes.
Deﬁnition 1. A tax function is feasible if it satisﬁes the following condi-
tions,
3t(y) ≤ y for all y ∈ R+ (4)




Condition (4) says that tax liabilities cannot exceed taxable income. Con-
dition (5) implies that both tax liabilities and after-tax income are non-
decreasing functions of pre-tax income.3 The budget balance condition (6)
means that income taxation is purely redistributive (i.e., zero revenue re-
quirement).
Our primary objective is to understand when progressive taxation emerges
as a voting outcome. We adopt the following deﬁnition of progressivity.4
Deﬁnition 2: A tax schedule is (marginally) progressive if and only if
t(y) is a convex function (i.e. marginal tax rates are monotonically increas-
ing).
The set of potential tax schedules is inﬁnitely dimensional. To limit the
voting problem over tax policies to a manageable number of dimensions we
shall thereafter restrict attention to the quadratic income tax function.
t(y)=−c + by + ay2 (7)
where c ≥ 0 is the uniform lump-sum transfer, b is the ﬂat tax parameter
(with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1)a n da is the progressivity tax parameter, with a>0
indicating a (marginally) progressive income tax and a<0 representing a
3This condition is usually derived instead of assumed in the optimal income tax litera-
ture with endogenous labor supply. Non-decreasing tax function is not required in Roemer
(1999).
4S i n c ew ea l l o wf o rn e g a t i v et a x e so u rd e ﬁnition of progressivity (marginal progressiv-
ity) does not necessarily correspond to the more usual deﬁnition of progressivity in terms
of increasing average tax rates (average progressivity) which gives a better indication of
the level of redistribution. But since the objective of this paper is to understand the preva-
lence of (weakly) convex tax function rather than the level of redistribution, the concept
of marginal progressivity seems more appropriate
4(marginally) regressive one. It is readily checked that the feasibility con-
ditions (4) and (5) impose the following lower and upper bounds on the
progressivity parameter: −b
2 ≤ a ≤ 1−b
2 . Essentially, the upper bound on
progressivity ensures that the marginal tax rate is less than one at the top
(and thus everywhere) and the lower bound on regressivity guarantees that
marginal tax rate is positive at the top (and thus everywhere). Combining
(6) and (7) yields
c = by + ay2 (8)
where y2 =
R
y2 dF(y). Hence, tax policies are bidimensional. Let the set of




2 ] × [0,1]
ª
. Plugging (7) and (8)
into (3) the after-tax income (consumption) of an individual with pre-tax
income y resulting from a tax policy (a,b) ∈ T is given by
x = y +( 1− b)(y − y) − a(y2 − y2). (9)
In this simple setting, the distribution of income is independent of the tax
policy and each individual only cares about his after-tax income as given by
(9).
We now turn to the voting problem over (non-linear) tax policies (a,b) ∈
T. A majority (or Condorcet) winning tax policy is a pair (a,b) that is
preferred by a majority of individuals to any other feasible pair (a0,b 0) ∈ T.
In the next section, we show that in general a majority winning policy exists
and that it involves progressive taxes. The intuition behind the existence
result is that individuals vote for tax policies that are on the boundary of
the feasible set.
3 Voting equilibrium
We ﬁrst look at the preferences of the voters in the (a,b) space5. An indi-
vidual with pre-tax income y is indiﬀerent about a tax change dt =( da,db)
if
5This description is borrowed from Roemer(1999).
5dx =( y − y)db +( y2 − y2)da =0 (10)







] ≡− ϕ(y). (11)







y2)=0 ,ϕ(1) < 2 and asymptotic values ϕ(y−)=
+∞ and ϕ(y+)=−∞. There exists also a unique y1 such that ϕ(y1)=2 .
It is given by y1 =1−
p
(1 − y)2 + σ2 with σ2 > 0 t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h e
income distribution. Note that y − σ <y 1 < y<
√
y2 < y + σ.
The directions of utility increase are
da > 0, db > 0 for 0 ≤ y ≤ y (12)
da > 0, db < 0 for y<y≤
p
y2
















Figure 1 (Roemer, 1999): Slope of indiﬀerence curves in the (a,b)-space
Using these observations about the indiﬀerence curves we can derive by
a simple geometric argument the preferred policy of each individual. To do
this it is convenient to break the income range into four separate intervals:




y2,1]. The set of feasible
tax policies is illustrated in Figure 2 by the parallelogram Γ = OABC with
7the indiﬀerence curves of a member of each income group Y1 to Y4 and the
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Figure 2: Feasible set and indiﬀerence curves
It follows from the construction of the income groups that
(1) for all y ∈ Y1: the indiﬀerence curve is negatively sloped and ﬂatter
than AB since 0 < ϕ(y) < 2; and utility increases in the North-East, since
y<y.H e n c e ,B i st h ep r e f e r r e dp o l i c yo fe a c hm e m b e ro ft h i sg r o u p( n o t e
that for the limit case y = y1, the indiﬀerence curve is parallel to AB and
this individual is actually indiﬀerent between all policies on the boundary
AB ).
(2) for all y ∈ Y2: the indiﬀerence curve is negatively sloped and steeper
than AB since 2 < ϕ(y) < +∞; and utility increases in the North-East,
since y<y.H e n c e , A is the preferred policy of this group (note that for
8the limit case y = y, the indiﬀerence curve is vertical and utility increases
in the East direction, since y<
√
y2. Hence A is also the preferred policy).
(3) for all y ∈ Y3: the indiﬀerence curve is positively sloped since ϕ(y) ≤
0; and utility increases in the South-East, since y<y≤
√
y2. Hence,
the preferred policy of this income group is A (note that for the limit case
y =
√
y2, the indiﬀerence curve is horizontal and this individual is actually
indiﬀerent between all policies on the boundary 0A ).
(4) for all y ∈ Y4: the indiﬀerence curve is negatively sloped and ﬂatter
than OC since ϕ(1) < 2; and utility increases in the South-West, since
√
y2 <y . Hence, O is the preferred policy of this income group.
This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The preferred policy (a,b) is
(i) B =( 0 ,1) for all 0 ≤ y ≤ y1; (conﬁscation)
(ii) A =( 1
2,0) for all y1 <y≤
√
y2; (maximum progressivity);
(iii) O =( 0 ,0) for all
√
y2 <y≤ 1 (no taxation).
We are now in a position to show that a majority winner in general exists
in this environment with no incentive eﬀects. The following proposition is a
direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Proposition 1: Given y1 =1−
p
(1 − y)2 + σ2 < y,
(a) if ym ≤ y1 then the tax policy B =( 0 ,1) is a majority winner.
(b) if ym >y 1 and F(
√
y2)−F(y1) ≥ 1/2, then the tax policy A =( 1
2,0)
is a majority winner.
If a majority of individuals belong to the low income group (Y1), the
voting outcome will be the conﬁscation policy, whereas if a majority belong
to the middle income group (Y2 +Y3) the voting outcome will be maximum
progressivity. The latter case is not surprising as progressivity enables the
middle class to minimize its own tax burden at the expenses of the rich and
the poor.
We now turn to the less straightforward case in which neither the low
income group nor the middle-income group form a majority on their own.
9We show that in this case the only potential Condorcet winner is the most
progressive policy.
Proposition 2: Assume that F(
√
y2) − F(y1) < 1/2 with y1 <y m
<
√
y2 . Then either the most progressive policy A =( 1
2,0) is a majority
winner or there is no majority winner.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that all individuals y<
√
y2 prefer the policy (a+ε,b)
to the policy (a,b),w i t hε > 0. Since ym < y<
√
y2,t h e yf o r mam a j o r i t y
and any policy not belonging to the segment AB [see Figure 2] is defeated
by this majority. Second, all individuals y>y 1 prefer policy A =( 1
2,0) to
any other policy belonging to the segment AB.S i n c ey1 <y m,t h e yf o r ma
majority, and policy A is the only potential majority winning policy.¥
Proposition 2 says that if the median voter prefers the most progressive
policy A, then any majority winner must consist of that policy even though
this is not optimal for a majority of individuals. Of course there remains
the possibility that a majority winner fails to exist. This is the case if there
exists a feasible deviation from policy A that is desirable for a majority
of individuals. The following proposition gives a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for such deviation not to exist and thus for policy A to be the
majority winner.
Proposition 3: Under the condition of Proposition 2, a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for policy A to be the majority winner is that F(y2(ϕ))






Proof. To prove that policy A is a majority winner under the conditions
stated in proposition 3, we must show that there exists no feasible deviation
from that point that could be supported by a majority coalition. Let us
denote any tax change from A =( 1
2,0) by da and db and let dτ = −db
da be the
direction of tax change. It is obvious from Figure 3 that the only feasible tax
changes are 0 ≤ dτ ≤ 2 with da < 0. Comparing all the possible directions
of tax change dτ with the properties of individual indiﬀerence curves as
10given in (11)-(12) we can determine the set of individuals favorable to any
tax change. First note that all changes of the type dτ ∈ [0,ϕ(0)] can be
disregarded since dτ ≤ ϕ(0) implies that all those with y ≤ ym are against
the reform. Similarly all changes of the type dτ ∈ [ϕ(1),2] can also be
disregarded since dτ ≥ ϕ(1) implies that all those with y ≥ ym are against
the reform. Hence the only candidates to defeat policy A are tax changes of
the type dτ ∈ Λ =( ϕ(0),ϕ(1)). Moreover each individual whose indiﬀerence
curve is such that ϕ(y)=dτ is indiﬀerent. It will prove useful to identify
any tax change (dτ) by the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of the indiﬀerent
agent (say, ϕ). From (11), it appears that the function ϕ(y) is not one-to
one in the relevant range Λ and that for each ϕ ∈ Λ one can associate the





2 .I t c a n b e
shown that y1(ϕ) is increasing and concave with domain Λ and range [0,y 1)
whereas y2(ϕ) is increasing and convex with domain Λ and range [
y2
y ,1]. For
each reform ϕ ∈ Λ, the set of individuals favoring the reform is given by all
the poor with income y<y 1(ϕ) and all the rich with income y>y 2(ϕ).
Policy A is thus a majority winner iﬀ for each ϕ ∈ (ϕ(0),ϕ(1)), F(y2(ϕ))
−F(y1(ϕ)) ≥ 1/2,( w i t hy1(ϕ) <y 1 <
y2
y ≤ y2(ϕ)).¥
Proposition 3 says that the policy preferred by the middle-income group
(i.e., maximum progressivity policy A) is the majority winner even though
this group does not form a majority coalition. The reason is due to the
disagreement among the other groups. Indeed for any tax change involving
less progressivity and higher ﬂat tax parameter (ϕ ∈ Λ), there is always
some poor with relatively high income (y>y 1(ϕ)) who do not ﬁnd the
increase in b big enough to compensate for the lower a and some rich with
relatively low income (y<y 2(ϕ)) who do not ﬁnd the decrease in a big
enough to compensate for the increase in b. The condition on the distribution
of income ensures that the size of this group is suﬃciently large to prevent
the formation of a majority coalition of the extremes.
11How likely are the conditions on the income distribution (in Propositions
1 and 3) for the existence of a majority winner? In order to see that we have
performed numerical calculations for speciﬁc distribution functions. Given
that pre-tax income is distributed on the interval [0,1] we have chosen the
Beta distribution which is deﬁned on the same interval. The Beta distri-
bution has two parameters (α > 0 and β > 0), varying which can generate
a wide variety of density functions6. The mean and variance of the Beta
distribution are given by y = α/(α+β) and σ2 = αβ/[(1+α+β)(α+β)2].
If α > 1 and β > 1 the distribution is unimodal. If α < 1 and β < 1 it
is U-shaped, while if α = β =1it is the uniform distribution. The degree
of skewness increases with the diﬀerence | α − β |. The Beta function is
symmetric if α = β , positively skewed if α > β and negatively skewed if
α < β.I fα ≤ 1 and β > 1 the density is J-shaped (monotonically increas-
ing) whereas if a>1 and b ≤ 1 it is the opposite (monotonically decreasing).
Increasing both α and β increases the density around the median.
Our calculations suggest that if the density function is unimodal, being
symmetric or (not too much) positively skewed, then either condition in
Proposition 1 b) or condition in Proposition 3 is satisﬁed implying that
maximum progressivity is a majority winner. If the density function is
suﬃciently skewed to the right Proposition 1 a) applies under which the
conﬁscation policy is a majority winner.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied majority voting over quadratic tax functions when
income is ﬁxed and taxation non distortionary. We have ﬁrst shown that
if a Condorcet winner exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then












α > 0 and β > 0.
12d e r i v e dn e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient conditions on the income distribution under
which a Condorcet winner exists. We ﬁnally computed numerically that
these conditions are satisﬁed for a large class of income distributions.
The existence of a Condorcet winner is a very rare phenomenon in mul-
tidimensional voting. The reason of its widespread existence in our setting
comes from the fact that the feasible set is closed and that voters have cor-
ner preferences. We believe that these two characteristics quite often show
up in economic problems, at least when individuals have ﬁxed endowments.
Examples of such problems range from tax choice in a general equilibrium
setting (De Donder(2000)) to the choice of environmental policy (Cremer et
al.(2001)). Despite the generality of this structure of preferences, it is to
t h eb e s to fo u rk n o w l e d g et h eﬁrst time (except in the two above-mentioned
papers) that the consequence for the existence of a Condorcet winner are
stressed in the economic literature7.
Even though the kind of structure we study in this model is far from
pathological, it is not easily extended to settings where the tax base is
endogenous. This is exempliﬁed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1991) who
study voting over quadratic taxation when taxation is distortionary. They
derive conditions on preferences and abilities distributions under which a
Condorcet winner exists. In their setting, individuals do not show corner
preferences (due to Laﬀer-type eﬀects) and the conditions they obtain are
highly restrictive and, to quote Roemer(1999), unreasonable.
We acknowledge this result8. This paper does not pretend to constitute
the ﬁnal word on the topic of voting over taxation, but simply to draw the
attention of the reader on the consequences of a quite common structure of
preferences on voting equilibrium.
7We thank Michel Le Breton for having drawn the attention of one of the authors on
this structure of preferences several years ago.
8In De Donder and Hindriks(2002), we introduce preferences for leisure and study
voting over quadratic taxation using other political equilibria than the Condorcet winner.
13Acknowledgments. This paper has been initiated while Philippe De
Donder was visiting the Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the Univer-
sity of Rochester. Financial support is gratefully acknowledged. The usual
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